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Introduction  
 
On October 17th, 2016, Anote Tong, the former President of the Republic of Kiribati (“Kiribati”), 
delivered a set of remarks at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. During his speech, 
President Tong focused on climate induced displacement, one of the manifestations of climate 
change that is increasingly under the international microscope:  
 
Weather and climate are without a doubt the most popular ice-breakers between 
unfamiliar people trying to establish some kind of a connection. And today, climate 
change has also become the hottest topic of discussion in the international arena. But 
what do climate change and recent international negotiations on the issue this mean for 
countries in different parts of the world, especially for those most vulnerable, like 
Kiribati? The brutal reality is that, for those of us living on low-lying atoll islands, our 
future survival as a people and a culture is very much in question. The scenarios 
projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicate that, even 
if the pledges on emissions made in Paris are fully delivered, my homeland will still be 
underwater well within the century.1 
 
President Tong’s remarks at Georgetown University, much like the speeches he has made 
throughout a lengthy career in public service, were an attempt to analyze the phenomenon of 
people being displaced from their homes and/or countries due to various manifestations of 
climate change (e.g., rising sea levels, desertification, extreme weather patterns). This article 
seeks to provide context for the urgency behind many of President Tong’s claims and delve into 
the impacts that recent, international environmental negotiations have had on the global state of 
affairs pertaining to climate induced displacement. Specifically, this article will examine the 
results of the following international environmental negotiations: the 21st Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21); the Second 
United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA II); and the 22nd Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP22). In order to properly 
evaluate the aforementioned Conferences and Assembly, this article will provide an overview of 
the history of international environmental negotiations as well as a review of legal code and 
political convention insofar as they pertain to climate induced displacement  
 
The issue of climate induced displacement is increasingly germane at such negotiations given 
recent studies that have been published and contain estimates of the number of people who may 
be potentially forced from their homes by climate change. According to one such study 
conducted by the International Organization for Migration, between 50 million and 350 million 
people could be displaced by climate change by 2050.2 The scope of this issue extends 
throughout the world: communities that can legitimately lay claim to being displaced by climate 
                                               
1 Tong, Anote. 2016. The global challenge of climate-induced migration. Georgetown University, Washington, 
D.C.: 
https://globalfutures.georgetown.edu/responses/the-global-challenge-of-climate-induced-migration. 
2 Laczko, Frank, and Christine Aghazarm. 2009. Migration, environment and climate change: Assessing the 
evidence. Switzerland: International Organization for Migration. 
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change range exist in Kiribati,3 the People’s Republic of Bangladesh,4 the State of Alaska,5 and 
many more countries.  
 
It is worth briefly noting that, throughout this article, those who are or will be displaced by 
climate change will be referred to as climate displaced persons (“CDPs”). This terminology 
captures both those who are displaced by climate change and remain within their country of 
origin and those who are forced to cross national borders. This article is not unique in utilizing 
such terminology, as is demonstrated by the work of Rosemary Lyster and others.6 However, by 
making use of the term CDPs, this article seeks to avoid entering into any discussion regarding 
the merits of such phrases as “climate refugees” or “climate migrants.” While some, such as 
François Gemenne, argue that it is vital for CDPs to referred to as “climate refugees” in order to 
acknowledge the fact that many displaced persons will likely come from developing countries 
that have historically contributed fewer greenhouse gas emissions (“GHG emissions”) than 
developed countries,7 the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st 
Century acknowledged that no terminology referring to persons displaced by climate change had 
yet been universally acknowledged or adopted.8 Given this ambiguity vis-a-vis the propriety and 
commonness of certain terms, this article will attempt to steer clear of vocabularic debate as best 
as is possible by exclusively utilizing the CDP designation.  
 
 
Relevant History  
 
A Review of the History of the COP 
 
The COP, which occurs on an annual basis and rotates between different parties within the 
Conference, is the decision making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). According to the website of the UNFCCC, “All States that are 
Parties to the Convention are represented at the COP, at which they review the implementation 
of the Convention and any other legal instruments that the COP adopts and take decisions 
necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention, including institutional and 
administrative arrangements.”9 The COP meets in order to develop agreements and policies that 
                                               
3 Farbotko, Carol. 2010. Wishful sinking: Disappearing islands, climate refugees and cosmopolitan experimentation. 
Asia Pacific Viewpoint (51): 47.  
4 Chaturvedi, Sanjay. 2010. Geopolitics of fear and the emergence of ‘climate refugees’: Imaginative geographies of 
climate change and displacements in Bangladesh. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 6 (2): 206. 
5 Marino, Elizabeth. 2012. The long history of environmental migration: Assessing vulnerability construction and 
obstacles to successful relocation in shishmaref, alaska. Global Environmental Change 22 (2): 374. 
6 Lyster, Rosemary. 2015. Protecting the human rights of climate displaced persons: The promise and limits of the 
united nations framework convention on climate change. In Research handbook on human rights and the 
environment., eds. A. Grear, L. Kotze. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
7 Haley-Benjamin, Vanessa, Carl Bruch, François Gemenne, Michael B. Gerrard, W. Chris King, and Benjamin 
Schachter. 2016. The debate: Can the world community handle environmental refugees? The Environmental Forum 
Nov./December 2016 : 52. 
8 Hantscher, Sinja. 2016. The united nations high commissioner for refugees' discourse on environmentally 
displaced persons: A double-edged sword? In Organizational perspectives on environmental migration., eds. Kerstin 
Rosenow-Williams, François Gemenne. 1st ed., 93. New York: Routledge. 
 
9 Conference of the parties (COP). 2014. Accessed: 2017. Available from http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6383.php. 
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further the mission of the UNFCCC, per Article 2 of the Convention, to stabilize greenhouse gas 
emissions in order to avoid harmful, anthropogenic effects within the climate system.10 Since it 
began in 1995, the COP has met 22 times, with the most recent edition having been held in 
Marrakech, Morocco. Different committees have been created over the history of the COP (e.g., 
an Adaptation Committee), and leadership of the COP is coordinated by the Secretariat of the 
UNFCCC and a rotating chair of the COP that is selected from the membership of the 
Conference.11 As Ramakrishna described in the late 1990s, one of the main functions of the 
UNFCCC is to coalesce and support efforts to aid developing countries that have contributed 
fewer GHG emissions to climate change than developed countries, have access to fewer 
resources than developed countries, and are often geographically disadvantaged insofar as they 
are more likely to suffer the consequences of climate change earlier than developed countries.12 
 
 
A Review of the History of the UNEA  
 
The UNEA first occurred in June 2014 in Nairobi, Kenya, the headquarters of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (“UNEP”).13 The UNEA is part-governing council, part-forum: it is 
attended by all United Nations member states (either by governmental representatives and/or 
members of respective countries’ civil societies) and assists in the contemplation and drafting of 
policy pertaining to the global environment. The UNEA was mandated into existence at the 2012 
Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in order to augment the 
operational efficiency of the UNEP and its Governing Council, which had been meeting 
regularly since 1973.1415 The first UNEA had a thematic focus on the Sustainable Development 
Goals (“SDGs”), whereas UNEA II’s main theme was “Delivering on the Environmental 
Dimension of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”16 According to official UNEP 
documentation and the website of the UNEA, 17 resolutions were adopted at the first UNEA,17 
and 25 resolutions were adopted at UNEA II.18 
 
 
                                               
10 Egenhofer, Christian, ed. 2008. Beyond Bali: Strategic issues for the post-2012 climate change regime. Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies. 
11 Consolidated historical membership charts. 2016. Accessed: 2017. Available from 
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/election_and_membership/application/pdf/consolidated_historical_membership_charts.
pdf. 
12 Kilaparti, Ramakrishna. 2000. The UNFCCC - history and evolution of the climate change negotiations. In 
Climate change and development., ed. L. Gómez Echeverri, 47. New Haven: Yale School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies. 
13 First united nations environment assembly. 2014. Accessed: 2017. Available from http://www.unep.org/unea1/en/. 
14 Sahba, Naysán. 2014. OurPlanet. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme.  
15 United Nations Environment Programme. 1973. Paper presented at Report of the Governing Council on the work 
of its first session, New York. 
16 United Nations Environment Programme. About UNEA. 2016. Accessed: 2017. Available from 
http://web.unep.org/unea/about-unea. 
17 United Nations Environment Programme. 2014. Resolutions and decisions adopted by the united nations 
environment assembly of the united nations environment programme at its first session on 27 june 2014. Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
18 United Nations Environment Programme. List of resolutions adopted at UNEA-2. 2016. Accessed: 2017. 
Available from http://web.unep.org/unea/list-resolutions-adopted-unea-2. 
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Relevant History and Context of Climate Induced Displacement 
 
For much of the 20th and 20st centuries, the predominant term used in debates regarding climate 
induced displacement was “environmental refugees.” The earliest deployment of that term is 
most correctly credited to Lester Brown, the founder of the World Watch Institute, in writings 
published in the early 1970s.19 However, “environmental refugees” did not enter into common 
parlance until the mid-to-late 1980s with a UNEP report written by Essam El-Hinnawi.20 As 
James Morrissey, in one of the definitive accounts of climate induced displacement’s history, 
puts it:  
 
[El-Hinnawi’s paper’s] effectiveness in raising the profile of the 'environmental refugee' 
was that El-Hinnawi provided the first formal definition of the term [“environmental 
refugee”]. This was important for operationalizing it, which in turn allowed for a 
blossoming of work that focused on both documenting the existence of migration forced 
by environmental crises, and on formulating numerical projections of future 
'environmental refugees'.21   
 
Following the 1985 UNEP report, the pace of research being conducted on climate induced 
displacement, and the potential number of CDPs, began to increase at a relatively rapid rate 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. One of the most influential authors of this era, Norman 
Myers, was particularly known for his claims that enormous numbers of CDPs did exist and 
would grow at an exponential clip in the early to mid-2000s: in one of his most recent publically-
available works, Myers asserts that “As far back as 1995 … environmental refugees totaled at 
least 25 million people,” and that as many as 200 million CDPs could exist in an unspecified 
near future.22 While Myers’ work is laudable, insofar as it has undoubtedly increased the amount 
of attention that policy and law makers have paid to climate induced displacement, his estimates 
are often outliers relative to other studies, and his predictions have been publically questioned by 
peers and media outlets.23  
Upon review of the available literature, no exact numbers of past, present, or future CDPs 
present themselves as having been universally, or majorly, accepted: therefore, in order to avoid 
predicating a conclusion upon data that may be highly contestable, this article will proceed and 
model itself upon studies, including a recent discussion paper published by the Office of Conflict 
Management and Mitigation, that acknowledge the likelihood of some tens of millions of CDPs 
while also opening the door for a larger number that can be clarified at a later date.24 
 
                                               
19 Saunders, P. 2000. Environmental refugees: The origins of a construct. In Political ecology: Science, myth and 
power., 218. London: Oxford University Press. 
20 Morrissey, James. 2012. Rethinking the 'debate on environmental refugees': From 'maximilists and minimalists' to 
'proponents and critics'. Journal of Political Ecology 19 : 36. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Myers, Norman. 2005. Contribution by prof. norman myers, green college, oxford university, U.K., 
"environmental refugees: An emergent security issue". Paper presented at 13th Economic Forum, Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) , Prague, Czech Republic. 
23 Barnes, Hannah. 2013. How many climate migrants will there be? BBC, 3 September 2013. Accessed 2016. 
24 Null, Schuyler, and Lauren Herzer Risi. 2016. Navigating complexity: Climate, migration, and Conflict in a 
changing world. Washington, D.C.: Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation; United States Agency for 
International Development; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  
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Policymakers, military leaders, and legal experts have been interpreting and responding to the 
work of researchers of climate induced displacement for close to three decades. Often, it is 
common for policymakers in both national (e.g., the U.S. Army) and international organizations  
(the United Nations) to frame climate induced displacement in security terms and depict CDPs at 
potentially destabilizing factors; as Nash deftly examines, even the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), the arm of the UN that is most centered around 
quantifying and supporting refugees and migrants, has demonstrated a predilection for 
‘securitizing’ CDPs.25 Securitizing rhetoric, or ‘problematizing rhetoric,’ is best understood as 
being any language that is applied to an issue or group of people (in this case, climate induced 
displacement and CDPs) and typically classifies said issue or group of people as being likely 
threats and/or threat-augmenting factors. The reason that such language might be employed is to 
shock governmental officials, large financial donors, or others into taking action on an issue that 
might otherwise be perceived as being relatively slow moving.26 Additional examples of the 
securitization of CDPs abound and include, but are not limited to, a 2015 Department of Defense 
Report that evoked and focused on the likelihood that, unchecked, climate induced displacement 
would augment pre-existing security threats and exacerbate the development of new security 
threats.27 
 
Before effectively analyzing the impacts of COP21, UNEA II, and COP22, one must briefly 
examine the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Refugees 
Convention”). The 1951 Refugees Convention is the fundamental, international legal 
underpinning of what countries should do, individually and collectively, in response to refugees. 
Ratified by 145 nations, the 1951 Refugees Convention provides for a definition of refugees, 
describes the obligations of states to care for said refugees, and attempts to quell any potential 
discontent with said obligations that could emerge and weaken the ties that bind states.28 For the 
purposes of this article, it is worth carefully highlighting the Convention’s parameters for who 
may, and may not, constitute a refugee:  
 
[The term “refugee” shall apply to those who,] owing to well founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.29 
 
This foundational, internationally-agreed upon document that governs refugee law does not 
include reference to environmental or climatic factors that might justify benefits being allotted to 
those who are displaced by phenomena unrelated to race, religion, nationality, and other such 
                                               
25 Nash, Sarah. 2016. Towards an ‘environmental migration management’ discourse: a discursive turn in 
environmental migration advocacy? In Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration., eds. Kerstin 
Rosenow-Williams, François Gemenne. 1st ed., 198. New York: Routledge.  
26  Ibid. 
27 Department of Defense. 2015. National security implications of climate-related risks and a changing climate. 
Department of Defense, 8-6475571. 
28 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, (2010): Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10. 
29 Ibid.  
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factors. Therefore, the majority of CDPs, unless other factors complicate their displacement, do 
not currently receive any international protection via the 1951 Refugee Convention. This fact has 
bedeviled advocates and the lawyers of CDPs for years, and all recent international 
environmental negotiations that have attempted to contend with the issue of climate induced 
displacement have been forced to address, in one way or another, the limitations imposed by the 
1951 Refugees Convention.  
 
 
Effects of the Paris Agreement and post-Paris Negotiations  
 
Given that the COP21, UNEA II, and COP22 negotiations have all occurred no more than two 
years in the past, and therefore it is difficult to accurately extrapolate the longitudinal impacts 
that said negotiations will have on climate induced displacement politics and law, this article 
analyzes the three recent conferences and assembly based upon the formal and informal language 
that they adopted vis-a-vis CDPs. Whereas the typical COP and UNEA produce numerous 
resolutions that pertain to disparate, narrow subjects, COP21 was unique because of its almost 
singular focus on an all-encompassing goal: the finalization of the so-called Paris Agreement. 
Ergo, with the Paris Agreement dominating the results of COP21 to a near-exclusive degree, 
analysis of the impacts of COP21 on climate induced displacement necessarily focuses on the 
Agreement.  
 
Given this, a simplistic search mechanism was applied to the Paris Agreement in order to 
ascertain whether it addressed climate induced displacement and/or CDPs. For searches of the 
Paris Agreement, as well as other documentation produced during COP21, UNEA II, and COP22, 
pertinent synonyms for the term “displacement” were searched for in order to ensure that no 
mention of the subject would go overlooked. Germane synonyms included “refugee(s),” 
“migrant(s),” “migration,” “movement,” “resettle,” and other, similar variations. Applying these 
search parameters to the Paris Agreement yielded only one result, found in the Preamble:  
 
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, 
when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their 
respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous 
peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in 
vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, 
empowerment of women and intergenerational equity…30 
 
The inclusion of an allusion to climate induced displacement in the Paris Agreement was 
significant for several reasons. The first such reason was the historic nature of the Agreement 
itself: following on the years of civil society calls for an overarching, international treaty on 
climate change, the final text of the Paris Agreement was greeted in some corners with joy and 
others with outright disregard.31 As Jacquet and Jamieson describe it, the Paris Agreement, by 
virtue of its largely-voluntary and non-binding set of principles, relies on civil society more than 
                                               
30 United Nations. Paris Agreement (12/12/2015).  
31 Jacquet, Jennifer, and Dale Jamieson. 2016. Soft but significant power in the paris agreement. Nature Climate 
Change 6 : 643.  
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previous international agreements for its own efficacious implementation.32 Given this, the 
Agreement’s official acknowledgement of climate induced displacement, and more specifically 
the rights that CDPs should be accorded, functions as a clarion call for advocates and 
policymakers to push their national governments in order to proactively address the thorny issue. 
 
The second, more disquieting reason behind the significance of the Paris Agreement vis-a-vis 
climate induced displacement is the fact that the language included in the final documentation 
was altered from earlier draft language that was much more forceful. As Savaresi notes, a 
climate induced displacement “coordination facility” was acknowledged in early drafts of the 
Agreement: by the time that COP21 concluded, such concrete language had been erased in favor 
of a more nebulous affirmation of the existence and rights of CDPs.33 However, in an 
accompanying document that was agreed upon in order to facilitate the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, more specificity is given to the climate induced displacement issue. In the document, 
the COP calls for the development of a task force that would be entrusted with the creation of 
recommendations for how the international community can best “avert, minimize and address” 
climate induced displacement.34 Inasmuch as a relatively short amount of time has passed since 
the conclusion of COP21, it is difficult to objectively and conclusively determine which of the 
two aforementioned documents has had a more significant impact on the state of affairs 
regarding climate induced displacement. However, given the more concrete nature of the 
Adoption of the Paris Agreement versus the Paris Agreement itself, the former has, and will 
likely have, a greater effect on CDPs and their affairs. With that being said, it is clear that 
COP21 was focused on international and national emissions targets to the extent that it was 
unable to devote a significant enough portion of time to climate induced displacement in order to 
resolve long-standing question marks surrounding the issue, thus handicapping its ability to 
include significant reference to CDPs in its final texts.35 
 
Following the December, 2015 conclusion of COP21 in Paris, France, UNEA II occurred in 
Nairobi, Kenya, in May 2016. According to the official website of the UNEA, a total of 25 
resolutions were formally adopted by the Assembly’s end.36 In order to ensure the analysis of 
these resolutions was uniform with the review conducted on COP21’s documents, the same 
search terms and parameters were utilized in both cases.  
 
Upon application of the aforementioned search parameters to the official resolutions adopted at 
UNEA II, it was found that only two contained any language that pertained to climate induced 
displacement. The first resolution, Protection of the Environment in Areas Affected by Armed 
Conflict (“2/15”), predominantly focused on the intersection between environmental degradation 
and armed conflict; specifically, the resolution sought to reaffirm pre-existing initiatives that 
pertained to environmental peacebuilding and support the development of new endeavors that 
                                               
32 Ibid.  
33 Savaresi, Annalisa. 2016. The paris agreement: A new beginning? Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 
34 (1):16. 
34 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, (2015): , http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf. 
35 Warren, Phillip. 2016. Evaluating the 'climate change displacement coordination facility': How the UNFCCC can 
address forced migration after paris COP21. Columbia Law Review Forthcoming. 
36 List of resolutions adopted at UNEA-2. 2016. Accessed: 2017. Available from http://web.unep.org/unea/list-
resolutions-adopted-unea-2. 
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might be able to address needs that are not presently being met by the international community.37 
2/15 acknowledged the causal links between environmental degradation (e.g., as might be caused 
by armed conflict) and displacement; additionally, 2/15 recommended that the Executive 
Director of the UNEP provide additional assistance to those countries that may be affected by 
armed conflict, displacement, and environmental degradation.38 However, neither 2/15’s 
acknowledgement nor its recommendation explicitly addressed climate induced displacement 
outside of the lenses of environmental degradation and environmental peacebuilding.  
 
The other UNEA II resolution that included reference to climate induced displacement, 
Combating Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought and Promoting Sustainable 
Pastoralism and Rangelands (“2/24”), included language that posited that sustainable, proactive 
land management practices could help ameliorate the likelihood of displacement occurring; with 
that being said, 2/24, much like 2/15 did, did not explicate or investigate the plight of CDPs 
beyond the realms of desertification and land degradation.39 Beyond 2/15 and 2/24, no other 
official UNEP or UN documentation that originated during UNEA II can be found that focuses, 
or even bears mention of, climate induced displacement. Considering the fact that UNEA are 
designed in order to allow for highly specified, myriad resolutions to be debated and adopted, the 
results of UNEA II vis-a-vis CDPs should be viewed as being a disappointment.  
 
The final, recent international environmental negotiation that this article evaluates is COP22, 
which concluded in December 2016 in Marrakech, Morocco. Perhaps the most well-known 
document to have been generated at COP22 is the Marrakech Action Proclamation For Our 
Climate And Sustainable Development (“Marrakech Proclamation”), which organizations and 
media outlets in some corners interpreted as a rebuttal to the then-President Elect Donald 
Trump’s having cast aspersions on the science and policy endeavors of the UN.404142 However, in 
applying the same search parameters that were applied to COP21 and UNEA II to the Marrakech 
Proclamation, it is revealed that the document contains no mention of migration, displacement, 
refugees, the movement of people, or CDPs.43 Though the document is short and typically broad, 
it does mention several facets of climate change and goals with specificity (e.g., a goal of $100 
billion for developing countries’ mobilization and sustainable development); given the fact that 
the document was signed by all attendees at COP22, it is fair to surmise that climate induced 
displacement did not draw the same level of consensus that renewable energy deployment, 
sustainable development, and other topics did.44 
 
                                               
37 United Nations Environment Programme. 2/15. Protection of the Environment in Areas Affected by Armed 
Conflict(5/23-27/2016, 2016). 
38  Ibid.  
39 United Nations Environment Programme. 2/24. Combating Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought and 
Promoting Sustainable Pastoralism and Rangelands(05/23-27/2016, 2016). 
40 King, Ed. 2016. Marrakech call decoded: UN sends drumpf its climate demands. Climate Home, 15/11/2016, 
2016. 
41 Editorial. 2016. Marrakech: Climate conference in grim political weather. Katoikos.eu, 11/22/2016, 2016. 
42 Venkat, Vidya. 2016. Marrakech action proclamation sends out a strong signal on climate. The Hindu, 18/11/2016, 
2016. 
43 Marrakech Action Proclamation for our Climate and Sustainable Development (2016). 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/marrakech_action_proclamation.pdf 
44 Ibid.  
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At COP22, 35 official ‘Decisions’ were adopted by the COP and two other, related governing 
bodies.45 The preponderance of these decisions, upon review, does not contain language or 
allusion to climate induced displacement and/or CDPs. Only one Decision, entitled Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change (“Warsaw 
International Mechanism Decision”), pertained to climate induced displacement; however, unlike 
the two resolutions discussed above that were adopted at UNEA II, the Warsaw International 
Mechanism Decision’s language regarding CDPs indicates both precision and an apprehension 
of the remarkable challenge that is climate induced displacement.4647 That is to say, the Warsaw 
International Mechanism Decision is a Decision, adopted by all UN member states, that clearly 
evinces the challenge that CDPs face and seeks to provide specific research and assistance into 
climate induced displacement without such research and assistance being interpreted through a 
secondary (e.g., environmental peacebuilding, sustainable development) lense.  
 
One additional, distinct but interrelated document presented at COP22 is worth noting: the 
Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (“Report of the Executive Committee of the 
Warsaw Mechanism”). The Executive Committee of the aforementioned International 
Mechanism presented this report to UNFCCC member states during COP22’s proceedings. In 
the Report, both migration and climate induced displacement are specifically mentioned over 
two dozen times.48 The Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw Mechanism is 
predominantly a review of the work of the Warsaw International Mechanism in the 12 months 
following COP21; therefore, it does not contain much new information, research, or pledges to 
action. However, there is one exception to that rule:  
 
The task force [on climate induced displacement underneath the Warsaw International 
Mechanism] is to deliver its recommendations [viz. climate induced displacement] no 
later than at COP 24 and it may assist the Executive Committee in guiding the 
implementation of the Warsaw International Mechanism, in an advisory role, specifically 
on activities related to enhancing the understanding of and expertise on how the impacts 
                                               
45 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Decisions adopted by COP 22 and CMP 12 and 
CMA 1. 2017. Accessed: 2017. Available from http://unfccc.int/2860.php#auv. 
46 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change, (2016): , 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/auv_cop22_i7_wim1.pdf. 
47 In order to avoid confusion, it is worth clarifying that this decision is named after an organization called the 
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (“Loss and 
Damage Mechanism”). The Loss and Damage Mechanism was established at COP19 in Warsaw, Poland, and is 
dedicated to investigating and promoting methodologies by which loss and damage caused by climate change can be 
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of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility, 
and the application of such understanding and expertise.49 
 
The significance of this section of the Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw 
Mechanism is that it attaches a hard deadline to international recommendations regarding climate 
induced displacement. Insofar as can be stated after review of the body of work created during 
COP21, UNEA II, and COP22, this Report breaks new ground by establishing an end date for 
the first phase of the process by which recommendations on how to respond to CDPs would be 
created and subsequently implemented. It could be argued that the most significant outcome of 
COP22 vis-a-vis climate induced displacement was the presentation of this Report and its 
assurances that, by COP24, recommendations for how nations should respond to CDPs will be 





In conclusion, this article’s objective was to analyze the impacts that COP21, UNEA II, and 
COP22 have had on the state of global, climate induced displacement by reviewing all official 
documentation generated during those negotiations. Despite numerous positive developments 
within the official, UN-sponsored environmental negotiations sphere (e.g., the Paris Agreement’s 
acknowledgement of the rights of CDPs, UNEA II’s two resolutions and their allusions to 
climate induced displacement, the COP22 announcement of a deadline for international 
recommendations on climate induced displacement), it is fair to assert that an insufficient amount 
of work has been accomplished in these recent conferences and assembly in order to bridge the 
gap created by a lack of political and legal protection for CDPs. The efforts of participants of 
COP21, UNEA II, and COP22 are likely to be viewed as important by future historians who 
themselves will be looking over the history of climate displacement policy. However, by 
COP22’s conclusion, CDPs were in approximately the same standing as they were at the opening 
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